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Accountable Care Organizations: Forcing Physician Self-Referrals to Improve Care?

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of2010 (PPACA) proposes several
"innovations that attempt to improve both the quality and affordability of health care services." 1
One way the Act seeks to accomplish this goal is through the establishment of Accountable Care
Organizations ("ACOs"). ACOs are collaborations that integrate providers, such as hospitals,
physicians, and others "around the ability to receive shared-saving bonuses from a payer by
achieving measured quality targets and demonstrating real reductions in overall spending growth
for a defined population ofpatients."2 ACOs are "a recognized legal entit[ies] under State law" 3
that aim to improve accessibility and quality while lowering the costs of medical care.4 The
coordination ofhealthcare providers is "achieved through initiatives such as creation of patientcentered medical homes, sharing of patient health information among providers, and
implementation of care management programs designed to facilitate best practices and improve
communication among providers and social services agencies throughout the community." 5
Proponents believe that "ACOs will change both the culture and practice patterns of
providers and as these changes are institutionalized, all payers and all patients will benefit from
the delivery of higher-quality, lower-cost, and better integrated services."6 The Obama
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administration is looking toward ACOs to streamline healthcare and move away from a
fragmented system towards an integrated system that focuses on quality care7 and cost
performance instead of volume and intensity of provided services. 8 Patients receive fragmented
care when they see multiple unrelated providers. Fragmented care ends up being costly, "since
provider payments are not linked to performance or outcomes and services can be duplicative,
and of lower quality, since providers lack fmancial incentives to coordinate care." 9 This disputes
the widely held assumption that increased medical services yields higher quality care. 10
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) will establish goals for federally
created ACOs established under the PPACA. Each ACO will be responsible for meeting or
exceeding quality performance and cost-saving goals, as determined by HHS. 11 Ifthe ACO is
successful in meeting these goals, the potential savings will be returned to the ACO from the
State and reinvested in patient care. 12 This concept is called gainsharing and allows physicians to
share a portion of the realized savings by working with other physicians to make a patient's
healthcare more efficient. 13 The gainsharing incentive structure is an overlay to the traditional
fee-for-service model. 14
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In August 2011, New Jersey Governor Chris Christie signed A-3636/S-2443 into law,
establishing the Medicaid Accountable Care Organization Project (''the project). 15 The law
authorizes the creation of ACOs in New Jersey that will be overseen by the State, specifically the
Department of Health and Senior Services. 16 New Jersey ACOs plan to target patients covered
by Medicaid, 17 the publicly subsidized health insurance program for poor, blind, and disabled
residents. 18 Under the ACO Project, New Jersey's Department of Health and Senior Services will
be responsible for certifying ACOs as "nonprofit coalitions of local health care providers who

organize themselves to improve care for a defined population of at least 5,000 Medicaid
enrollees." 19 A defined population might include Medicaid enrollees living in a city or cluster of
smaller municipalities. 20
Similar to federally created ACOs, the New Jersey ACO model "is centered on
improving treatment of chronic conditions, like diabetes and high blood pressure, reducing
emergency room visits and hospitalizations, and coordinating patient care among all providers in
a geographic region, like Camden or Trenton."21 The model also depends on technology,
including good healthcare data that will help identify communities and patients in the most
need.2 2 Enhanced technology will also allow electronic patient records to be immediately
accessible to all hospitals and doctors treating a patient,23 helping to coordinate care.
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As the New Jersey law stands today, it is, in some instances, in violation ofNew Jersey's
physician self-referral law: the Codey Law.24 A self-referral is "a referral to an entity or family
member in which the physician has a financial interest."25 Many legislators and policy makers
have argued that health care costs and utilization inappropriately increase when physicians are
able to obtain financial profits from their health care services referrals.26 One argument is that if
physicians are unable to financially benefit from their referrals, they will not be motivated by
profit to make as many medically unnecessary referrals. 27
New Jersey enacted the Codey Law in 1989 to prohibit physicians from referring patients
to health care services in which the physician has a significant beneficial interest.28 The statute
defines "significant beneficial interest" as "any financial interest except financial interests in
leases and publicly traded securities."29 There is a comparable federal law: the Physician's SelfReferral Law ("Stark Law"), 30 which is part of the Social Security Act. 31 The Stark Law
"prohibits physicians from referring Medicare and Medicaid patients for designated health
services (including inpatient and outpatient services) to entities with which the physician has a
financial relationship, unless the activity falls within a regulatory exception." 32 Because the
participating ACO physicians have a financial interest in the ACO, the physician will be
violating the Stark Law or the Codey Law by referring to a physician or hospital within the
ACO. However, a limitation on referrals within the ACO defeats the purpose of the project and
will hinder the ACO's prospects of meeting its requirements.
24
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Some of the referrals that will occur within the ACO will violate the Codey Law. In
order to succeed in implementing A COs in New Jersey, the Board of Medical Examiners (BME)
under the authority of the State of New Jersey should issue an advisory letter which includes
regulatory waivers that will exempt ACOs participants from violating the Codey Law while
participating in the ACO and referring to fellow ACO physicians. In October 2011, the Center
for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) released the interim final Federal Regulations for
AC0s. 33 The Regulations include a waiver to exempt ACOs participants from the Stark Law
when34 "the financial relationship is reasonably related to the purposes of the Shared Savings
Program."35 However, these Federal waivers will not protect New Jersey ACO participants from
the Codey Law. Yet, even though a referral may appear to be a self-referral within the ACO,
closer scrutiny will show that not all self-referrals will violate the Codey Law. Thus, not all selfreferrals within the ACO will require exemption from the Law.
The thesis of my Note is that New Jersey's legislation enacting the Medicaid
Accountable Care Organization Demonstration Project will violate New Jersey's Codey Law
because it encourages physician self-referrals that are prohibited by the Codey Law. By
analyzing the federal government's waivers to the Stark Law, New Jersey can establish
regulations that will allow ACOs to optimize gainsharing without violating the law. Part II of this
Note takes a detailed look at what an Accountable Care Organization is and why many view it as
a promising way to lower health care costs. Next, I will explain the current New Jersey
legislation authorizing the establishment of A COs and the New Jersey law that prohibits self-
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referrals. I will also analyze the CMS's Federal Regulations for ACOs, which will exempt A COs
from certain provisions of federal physician self-referrals laws.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The ACO Concept
An ACO is an "integrated healthcare delivery system that relies on a network of primary
care physicians, one or more hospitals, and sub-specialists to provide care to a defined patient
population." 36 The system would reward hospitals and physicians for reporting certain quality
measures and "link payment to the attainment of performance goals," such as achieving better
clinical outcomes and lowering costs in order to yield increased value. 37 Under this model, the
hospital and physician networks would be responsible for the quality of care delivered to patients
and would receive bonuses for providing high-quality, low-cost care.38 ACOs are modeled after
entities regarded by the healthcare industry as quality leaders in health care, such as the Mayo
Clinic, Kaiser Permanente, Geisinger Health System, and the Cleveland Clinic.39
The groundwork for the shared accountability method emerged from a January 2007

Health Affairs article and a March 2007 report to Congress from the Medicare Payment Advisory
Committee.40 In the Health Affairs article, Elliot Fisher and colleagues argued that
Medicare beneficiaries receive most of their care from relatively coherent
local delivery systems comprising physicians and the hospitals where they
work or admit their patients. Efforts to create accountable care
organizations at this level-the extended hospital medical staff-deserve
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consideration as a potential means of improving the quality and lowering
the cost of care. 41
Furthermore, Dr. Fisher, who coined the term "ACO," wrote that
these measures should rapidly move from the current generation of
technical quality measures to focus on patient-level health outcomes and
experience measures that reflect ACOs' ability to deliver patient-centered
care that is well coordinated across providers and improves outcomes for
patients.42
Promoting a more efficient use of care settings, providers, and use of treatments will
theoretically allow ACOs to reach these goals. 43 There will be an emphasis on physicians instead
of insurers or hospitals since physicians "control (directly or indirectly) 87% of all personal
health spending. ,,.w
1. Patients

ACOs can benefit patients in many ways. 45 They provide patients with a greater role in
guiding of their own care, offering incentives to prevent diseases, and reducing duplicative
tests.46 Patients receive much of their healthcare separately and many hope the ACO model will
prove that this method works better than a patchwork of services and costs less in order to
work. 47 However, patients are not required to participate in the AC0. 48 ACO providers are
required to notify their patients, who then have the option to go to another doctor if the patient
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does not want to participate in the ACO 49 without paying more. 50 The patient can decline to
have his data shared within the AC0, 51 but ideally the providers will track and share patient
history electronically. 52 Such data and history will allow the providers to develop ways together
to control or prevent illness. 53 Physicians will be likely to want to refer patients to specialists and
hospitals within the ACO network. 54
2. Gainsharing
As policymakers face the failure of fee-for-service medicine to properly align quality and
efficiency standards, a shared accountability tactic to physician payment has emerged. 55 Under
the current "fee-for-service" system, Medicaid providers are paid for services performed.
Therefore, providers do not have an economic incentive to eliminate unnecessary services.
Unlike the typical fee-for-service model, Medicaid will compensate ACO-participating providers
not only for services performed, but also for "demonstrating improved clinical performance and
increased efficiency through collaboration with other providers in the network" 56 through the
concept of gainsharing as an incentive to increase care by lowering costs. Gainsharing refers to
the "sharing of cost savings attributable to physicians' efforts in controlling the costs of
providing patient care."57 The Department of Health and Senior Services, while utilizing
outcome evaluation data provided by the Rutgers Center for State Health Policy,

49

50
51
52

/d.
!d.
!d.

N.J. lamakers advance bill on rewards for preventing. controlling illnesses among N.J. Poor, NJ.COM (March 12,
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Jackson Williams, J.D., M.P.A., 1l1e Shared Accountability Approach to Physician Payment: Four Options for
Developing Accountable Care Organizations. 7 Ind. Health L. Rev. 185 (20 I 0)
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57
Ellen Y. Weissman, Esq., Structuring Incentive Payment and Shared Savings Programs, HEALTI-l LAWYERS,
(March 12, 20 12) http://www.healthlawycrs.org/Events/Programs/Materials/Documents/ MM I 0/weissman.pdf

shall approve only those gainsharing plans that promote: improvements in health
outcomes and quality of care, as measured by objective benchmarks as well as
patient experience of care; expanded access to primary and behavioral health care
services; and the reduction of unnecessary and inefficient costs associated with
care rendered to Medicaid recipients residing in the ACO's designated area. 58
ACOs will be rewarded for their efficiency relevant to their previous levels of efficiency. 59 If the
ACO meets quality and savings requirements, it will qualify for a percentage of the savings. 60
Overall, doctors, hospitals, and insurance companies in New Jersey's poorest communities will
receive financial rewards for preventing and controlling illnesses, instead of just treating them. 61
Providers would get more money for keeping their patients out of the hospital and healthy, and
not just for providing more procedures. 62 However, there is also a penalty for being inefficient. 63
If an ACO does not save enough money, the ACO would have to pay the cost of the investments
it made.64 It could also have to pay a penalty if performance and savings benchmarks aren't

In order to control health care costs in general, doctors will need to stop providing costly
medical services that are unlikely to help patients. 66
[A]lthough the reimbursement methodology used for hospitals creates an
incentive to provide services cost effectively, the traditional reimbursement
system for physicians creates an incentive for them to order more services: the
greater the volume of services, the greater the reimbursement.67
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NJ.COM, (Jan. 24,

Physician orders can drive up hospital costs.68 This could arguably be restrained, though, because
A COs make providers jointly accountable so all participating providers will have a financial
incentive to save money. 69 One way to save a significant amount of money is to avoid
unnecessary tests and procedures, which drastically drive up costs. 70 Other ways that A COs will
be able to reduce costs is through lowering administrative costs, eliminating waste, and better
patient care for the chronically ill. 71
One concern from hospital and doctor groups is that they will be held accountable if
patients go outside an ACO for care. 72 These groups want less stringent standards of being held
financially accountable for these patients and are resisting efforts to penalize them if they miss
savings targets. 73 However, ACOs will be set up to reach cost savings goals because of its
resources and capacities. 74 ACOs have deeper financial resources than fragmented care. 75 For
example, ACOs will have access to better health records and data analysis. 76 This will make it
easier to coordinate care. Also, ACOs will have better management expertise and greater
capital. 77

B. MEDICARE AND CMS ACO REGULATIONS
1. Medicare ACOs and the Affordable Care Act
The PPACA "authorized Medicare to enter into contracts with ACOs in what is called the
Medicare Shared Savings Program ... [and] ... left it to CMS to decide on the rules and

68/d
69
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Implementing the Affordable Care Act: What Role For Accountable Care Organizations? Symposium, A COs and
the Decline ofPhysician Autonomy, Jessica Mantel, Seton Hall University School of Law (October 28, 2011 ).
12/d
73
Jordan Rau, Insurers, health-care providers at odds on rules for 'accountable care organizations, KAISER
HEALTH NEWS (January 9, 2011).
Mantel, supra note 71.
75 ld
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Id

71/d

standards for this program, and the agency issued final regulations in October 2011."78 Prior to
the PPACA, CMS conducted its own demonstration project from 2005 through 2010, the
Medicare Physician Group Practice demonstration, which involved one physician-hospital
organization and nine multispecialty group practices.79 The ten organizations could retain a
"portion of the savings they generated for Medicare, relative to a projected spending target, and
they could increase their share of savings depending on how well they performed on a set of 32
quality measures."80 This project was considered to be the immediate predecessor to ACOs and
the results "suggest that ACOs will be able to improve the quality of care they deliver (at least as
measured by process-oriented clinical quality measures) but may have a harder time generating
savings." 81 CMS projects that the Medicare Shared Savings Program will generate up to $940
million in net federal savings in its first four years, assuming 270 ACOs sign up to participate. 82
CMS expects better evidence about how to reduce costs using A CO-style payment arrangements
and improve quality within the next few years. 83

2. Self-Referral Laws
Distributing bonus payments among providers and structuring an ACO presents
challenging legal issues. 84 ACO "[p]rovider and practitioner collaboration may implicate a
variety of federal and state healthcare program fraud and abuse laws." 85 ACOs that are
successful enough to earn "incentive bonuses or that receive partial capitation must find a
mechanism to distribute the bonuses or partial capitation to participating providers in a manner
78

The Next Steps for ACOs, HEALTH AFFAIRS (January 31, 2012)
http://www.healthaffairs.orglhealthpolicybriefslbrief.php?brief_id=6I
79 Jd.
80 /d
81 Id
82 /d
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Glenn E. Soloman, Robert W. Lundy, David A. Hatch, Future Models: The formation ofaffordable care
organizations may revolutionize the concept ofmanaged care, 33 L.A. Law 34,37 (2010-2011).
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that provides incentives for qualifying behavior but at the same time does not violate federal and
state laws relating to patient referrals."86 Because of the financial incentives to keep an ACO
patient within the ACO discussed above, ACO participants will likely violate Physician SelfReferral Laws.

87

Under these laws, "if a physician has any financial relationship with an entity

that furnishes so-called designated health services, such as a hospital, the physician may not refer
any [Medicaid] patients to that entity unless the relationship fits into an exception. " 88 As a result,
"any shared savings program must be structured so that it fits within existing Stark exceptionseven though doing so may limit the ability of an ACO to recognize specific providers for their
contributions to cost savings and higher quality care."89 Many legislators and policy makers have
argued that health care utilization and costs increase inappropriately when physicians are able to
reap financial profits from their referrals of health care services.90 One argument of legislators
and policy makers is that if physicians cannot benefit financially from their referrals, they will
not only make fewer referrals, but the referrals they do make will be medically unnecessary and
motivated solely by profit.91
The Federal Physician Self-referral Law ("Stark") is found in the Social Security Act.

92

prohibits physicians from referring Medicare and Medicaid patients for designated health
services (including inpatient and outpatient services) to entities with which the physician has a
financial relationship, unless the activity falls within a regulatory exception. 93 This is enforced
by CMS.94 The Stark Law defines "referral" broadly, as a
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Soloman, supra note 84.
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93
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87
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It

request by a physician for an item or service payable under Medicare or Medicaid
(including the request by a physician for consultation with another physician and any test
or procedure ordered or performed by such other physician), or a request by a physician
for the establishment of a plan of care that includes the provision of a DHS.95

The definition of"referral" does not include services personally performed by a
referring/ordering physician,_but services furnished by employees of, or other members of the
same group practice as, the ordering physician. 96 Accordingly, physicians who personally
perform the service they order for their patients can structure arrangements without worrying
about potential Stark violations. 97 In order to implement ACOs supported by PPACA, "new
regulations clearly delineating permissible referral arrangements, incentive gainsharing
arrangements, and cost-reduction mechanisms are essential."98
The New Jersey Legislature enacted the Codey Law in 1989 as New Jersey's version of
the federal Stark Law. 99 The law intended to "eliminate financial incentives to physicians and
other practitioners licensed by the New Jersey Board of Medical Examiners (BME) to refer their
patients to entities in which they held any fmancial interest."

100

2. CMS Federal Regulations
Congress has realized that an ACO program implicates the Stark Law and as a result, the
"PPACA gives authority to HHS to waive [this statute] for the purpose of implementing the
ACO program." 101 Legislators and policymakers assume that the ACO will be "composed of
providers that tend to refer to one another (either admitting to the same hospital or referring to a

95

Stark Law: Information on penalties, legal practices, latest news and advice (FAQs), STARKLAW.ORG, (March 12,
2012) http://starklaw.org/
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Audrey A. Hale, Kristy Hlavenka, Sweeping Changes to New Jersey's Codey Law, DRINKER BIDDLE (April 23,
2009) http://www.drinkerbiddle.com/files/Publication/755ab5ee-eb3 f-4 75 f-b8811oo ld
101
Soloman, supra note 84.

common set of specialists."

102

On October 20, 2011, CMS issued its interim fmal version of

federal regulations for A COs established under the PPACA. 103 The regulations are important
because an ACO's success depends on the rules - 104 if the rules "give providers too much
flexibility, savings could vanish- or ACOs could even end up becoming a fiscal burden." 105
However, if the rules are too strict, provider groups fear that few doctors and hospitals may join
the AC0.

106

The Secretary of Health and Human Services, Kathleen Sebelius, has determined,

"based on consideration of public input and the Department's own analysis, that it is necessary to
waive certain provisions of the Physician Self-Referral Law." 107 Section 1899(t) of the Act, as
added by the Affordable Care Act, "authorizes the Secretary to waive certain fraud and abuse
laws as necessary to carry out the provisions of section 1899 of the Act." 108
There are five waivers listed in the regulations: ACO Pre-participation Waiver, ACO
Participation Waiver, Shared Savings Distribution Waiver, Compliance with the Stark Law
Waiver, Waiver for Patient Incentives. 109 The first four waivers protect arrangements involving
"an ACO, its ACO participants, and/or its ACO providers/suppliers, if the ACO has a
participation agreement and remains in good standing under that agreement." 110 The fifth waiver,
the ACO pre-participation waiver, is available for start-up arrangements (as defined in the
waiver) provided that the "ACO is making good faith efforts to form an ACO and to submit an
application to participate in the Shared Savings Program, and all other conditions of the waiver
102

CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 4.
Glenn E. Soloman, Robert W. Lundy, David A. Hatch, Future Models: The formation ofaffordable care
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110
42 C.F.R. Chapter IV (2011).
108

are satisfied." 111 These five waivers provide flexibility for A COs and their constituent parts to
pursue a wide array of activities, including start-up and operating activities that further the
purposes of the Shared Savings Program. 112 The waiver specifically for compliance with the
physician self-referral law is intended to
ease the compliance burden on providers that might elect to use existing Physician SelfReferral Law exceptions for their ACO arrangements and to reassure those with existing
arrangements that already fit in such an exception that they need not undertake a separate
legal review under the Federal anti-kickback statute or Gainsharing CMP . 113

Waivers are not always needed. A waiver of a "specific fraud and abuse law is not
needed for an arrangement to the extent that the arrangement: ( l) does not implicate the specific
fraud and abuse law; or (2) implicates the law, but either fits within an existing exception or safe
harbor, as applicable, or does not otherwise violate the law." 114 Arrangements that do not fit in a
waiver have no special protection and must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis for compliance
with the Physician Self-Referral Law. 115 Failure to fit in a waiver is not, in and of itself, a
violation of the laws. 116 Existing exceptions and safe harbors might apply to ACO arrangements,
depending on the circumstances. 117 These include, among others, Physician Self-Referral Law
exceptions for "employment, personal services arrangements, in-office ancillary services,
electronic health records (EHR) arrangements, risk-sharing, and indirect compensation
arrangements (to the extent an ACO arrangement is an indirect financial relationship)." 118
The waivers will be self-implementing. Apart from meeting applicable waiver conditions,
no special action (such as the submission of a separate application for a waiver) is required by
/d
Jd
113 Jd
114
42 C.F.R. Chapter IV (2011).
liS /d.
116 /d.
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112

parties in order to be covered by a waiver. Parties need not apply for an individualized waiver. 119
Moreover, when a waiver requires that the terms of the arrangement be reasonably related to the
purposes of the Shared Savings Program, "the arrangement need only be reasonably related to
one enumerated purpose, although we would expect that many arrangements would relate to
multiple purposes."

120

Where a reasonable relationship exists, it should not be difficult for parties

to "articulate clearly the nexus between their arrangement and the purposes of the Shared
Savings Program." 121
The ACO pre-participation and ACO participation waivers will also require an "audit
trail of contemporaneous documentation that identifies core characteristics of the arrangement
(as listed in the waiver text}, is maintained for 10 years, and is available to the Secretary, upon
request." 122 There is also a transparency requirement that requires public disclosure of those who
seek waiver protection arrangements. 123 The public disclosure will include the description of the
arrangement, but shall not include the financial or economic terms of the arrangement." 124 The
Final ACO Waivers Rule represents a dramatic departure for the Agencies, especially with
regard to enforcement of the Stark law. 125 By allowing compensation to physicians to incentivize
more efficient and effective care, and by focusing on procedural requirements ... the Agencies
are "relieving A COs and their participants of substantial regulatory uncertainty and burdens that
would otherwise interfere with effective participation in the Shared Savings Program." 126
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However, most states, like New Jersey, have their own versions of the federal selfreferral laws, which are not covered by this waiver. ACO advocates, including hospitals and
physicians, argued that the laws are legal barriers that would prevent organizational, group, and
individual providers from forming legitimate ACOs under the current laws. 127 Stakeholders have
expressed concern that the restrictions these laws place on certain arrangements between
physicians, hospitals, and other individuals and entities may impede development of some of the
innovative integrated-care models envisioned by the Shared Savings Program. 128 The New Jersey
legislation allows for waivers of the physician self-referral law, but waivers have yet to be
implemented. It authorizes the Commissioner of Human Services to
apply for such State plan amendments or waivers as may be necessary to
implement the provisions of this act and to secure federal financial participation
for State Medicaid expenditures under the federal Medicaid program, and shall
take such additional steps as may be necessary to secure on behalf of participating
ACOs such waivers, exemptions, or advisory opinions to ensure that such A COs
are in compliance with applicable provisions of State and federal laws related to
fraud and abuse, including, but not limited to, anti-kickback, self-referral, false
.
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C. NEW JERSEY ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS FOR MEDICAID
PATIENTS
1. New Jersey ACO Legislation
The New Jersey Legislation establishing the Medicaid Accountable Care Demonstration
Project is "[a]ligned closely with the ACOs described in the federal Affordable Care Act," as the
legislation "would create multi-stakeholder, geographic Medicaid AC0s." 130 The Medicaid
ACOs will be similar to the Medicare A COs discussed in the PPACA with regards to technology
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and clinical theory, 131 however the key difference is which patients each ACO is targeting. 132
The New Jersey law authorizes a three-year Medicaid ACO demonstration project 133 and
community-based, non-profit coalitions can apply for recognition by the State of New Jersey as a
Medicaid AC0. 134 The applicants will need 100% of the acute care hospitals, 75% of the primary
care providers, two behavioral health providers, and two community residents from that
geography on the board of the organization. 135
The New Jersey Legislation establishing the Medicaid Accountable Care Demonstration
project seeks to:
(1) increase access to primary care, behavioral health care, pharmaceuticals, and
dental care by Medicaid recipients residing in defined regions; (2) improve health
outcomes and quality as measured by objective metrics and patient experience of
care; and (3) reduce unnecessary and inefficient care without interfering with
patients' access to their health care Eroviders or the providers' access to existing
Medicaid reimbursement systems. 1 6
A major goal is also to reduce the inappropriate utilization of high-cost emergency care by
Medicaid recipients and others, especially where an individual's need is more properly addressed
through non-emergency primary care treatment. 137
While an ACO alters the coordination and delivery of care, it does not seek to change the
reimbursement process: doctors, hospitals and other caregivers will continue to bill the state's
Medicaid program, which is administered through private insurance providers. 138 Participating
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providers will still receive their usual Medicaid payments. 139 Under the ACO Projec4 payment
shall continue to be made to providers of services and suppliers participating for services
provided to managed care recipients or individuals who receive services on a fee-for-service
basis in the same manner as they would otherwise be made, except that the ACO is eligible to
receive gainsharing payments in addition. 140
The law does not require the A COs to focus on any particular region. 141 However, the
law does require an ACO to focus on a geographic region with at least 5,000 Medicaid patients
and a hospital that treats a large number of so-called "charity care patients," or those without
insurance or an ability to pay. 142 New Jersey is a state with socioeconomic segregation- the poor
tend to live in cities while the wealthy are more likely found living in the suburbs. 143 Therefore,
Medicaid A COs will probably be implemented in New Jersey cities.
Many New Jersey State Legislators believe ACOs are necessary because the State is
going broke. 144 New Jersey in particular is seen as an outlier in hospitalization and care.

145

The

law is about "spending State health care dollars smarter, and improving care for people who
depend on our State's health care safety net for access to medical services," said Senator
Whelan, D-Atlantic, and a member of the Senate health panel. 146 Senator Whelan also stated,
"[r]igbt now, we lack the objective evaluation and cost-effective protections to make sure that
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we're getting the biggest bang for our buck, and providing the best care possible for people
enrolled in the Medicaid system. It's time that we do better for New Jerseyans in need." 147

2. Medicaid in New Jersey 148
Legislators and policymakers conceived the New Jersey ACO model "as a way to
achieve and reward high-quality, appropriately accessible and affordable patient care in
communities in which these traits are most often and obviously lacking." 149 New Jersey's ACO
Project will focus on Medicaid patients. 150 Although the PPACA does not confine ACOs to
Medicaid patients, the ACOs established under this project will be restricted to the indigent. 151
Medicaid provides health insurance to pregnant women, parents/caretakers and dependent
children, and people who are aged, blind or disabled. 152 Medicaid pay for hospital services,
doctor visits, prescriptions, nursing home care and "other healthcare needs, depending on what
program a person is eligible for." 153 The Medicaid program provides coverage for roughly 1.3
million people in New Jersey 154 and the State's Medicaid budget in fiscal year 2010 was $10.7
billion. 155 The Governor, legislators and New Jersey taxpayers are concerned with the
"affordability of the existing Medicaid program, let alone any expansions to the program." 156
The federal government provides over 50% of Medicaid funds, 157 but States are responsible for
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"In 1995, New Jersey Medicaid began moving Medicaid clients from a traditional fee-for-service health
insurance program, in which healthcare providers bill Medicaid directly, into managed care. Under managed care,
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finding solutions to Medicaid budgetary problems stemming from rising Medicaid costs. 158
Medicaid patients are two times more likely to go to the ER than their own doctor, 159 which
leaves these patients without any coordinated care. 160 Because a hospital is always staffed, there
is less incentive to go to a private physician's office and wait for care. 161 Focusing on Medicaid
makes particular sense in New Jersey because the State has a very fragmented marketplace of
hospitals, providers, and payers. 162 The high concentration of Medicaid patients in urban,
impoverished cities, "with a high percentage covered by government-sponsored health plans ...
will make the ACO implementation model easier." 163 Medicaid patients are frequent utilizers of
emergency rooms, which dramatically increases health care costs. 164 Reducing unnecessary "ER
and hospital use for complex, Medicaid patients [will be] is less disruptive to the existing
business model of New Jersey's hospitals and healthcare providers." 165
New Jersey has dysfunctional care. Although New Jersey has high quality doctors, care is
uncoordinated and it is often difficult for the most wlnerable patients- the poor, people with
disabilities or poor housing, and re-entering prisoners- to get primary care treatment. 166 Vincent
Polistina, R-Atlantic, a member of the Assembly Health & Senior Services Committee,
explained that
[o]ur current health care delivery and payment system often fails to provide high
quality, cost-effective health care to the most wlnerable patients, many of whom
have limited access to primary care services.... Typically, individuals who incur
158
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the highest medical costs, those cycling in and out of the hospital, are the ones
who usually receive the poorest care. These are patients who tend to delay care,
underutilize preventive care, seek care in hospital emergency departments or are
admitted to hospitals for preventable problems. 167
Polistina believes that "ACOs should help them better navigate the health care system, resulting
in better care and lower costs for the state's Medicaid program." 168
The Demonstration Project would not change the way in which Medicaid claims are
currently paid. Rather, it would "allow an additional payment to providers participating in the
Medicaid ACO to the extent savings are achieved (and from the savings realized, not from
additional or new revenue required to fund the Project) as a result of improvements in access to
needed services, achievement of quality standards, and coordination and information-sharing
among the various participating providers." 169 The Medicaid ACO will '"sit on top' of the
existing care delivery and payment system and function as an invisible (to the patient) cohesive
layer." 170 It would permit voluntary participation by a Medicaid managed care organization
(MCO). In addition, the MCO would continue to receive premium payments from Medicaid and
operate in accordance with its Medicaid contract." 171

3. Camden Coalition of Healthcare Providers
The groundwork of an ACO for the indigent has already been established in Camden,
New Jersey. 172 The Camden Coalition ofHealthcare Providers is a non-profit organization
committed to improving the quality, capacity, and accessibility of the healthcare delivery system
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Tom Moran, Focus on 'Super Users • saves lives and dollars in New Jersey, NJ.COM (Jan. 25, 2011)
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in Camden, New Jersey. 173 The broad partnership includes primary care doctors, nurses,
hospitals, mental health caregivers, patient advocates and insurance representatives. 174 Dr.
Jeffrey Brenner, a family doctor, created the organization in 2002. 175 It focuses on a small group
of"super users" who make frequent hospital visits and absorb a great share of medical
spending. 176 By providing more care for this group, he is driving down costs by nearly half and
creating better outcomes. 177 The Camden Coalition is the model that State Legislators and others
used in creating demonstration projects across New Jersey.
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Two similar citywide healthcare

coalitions have been formed in the cities of Trenton and Newark. 179
Data mining helped shape the operation of the Camden Coalition. 180 The Coalition
focused on gathering data on healthcare "hot spots," city blocks with high concentrations of the
most costly and sickest patients.

181

The vast majority of these patients are covered by

Medicaid. 182 The Coalition examined seven years of patient records and found that "20 percent
of patients absorbed 90 percent of the healthcare expenditures in Camden." 183 Moreover, may of
these patients live in the same area. 184 Members of the coalition realized that by focusing on
these clusters of high-cost, chronically ill patients, they could have a real impact on the city's
overall healthcare picture. 185 So far, the Coalition is seeing positive results. 186 Patients are
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healthier and happier and initial results show a 40 percent to 50 percent reduction in healthcare
costs. 187

IV. Analysis
A. The Medicaid Accountable Care Demonstration Project established by New
Jersey law violates the Codey Law.
The ACO gainsharing structure encourages referrals within the ACO. However, these
will be seen as self-referrals, which are often considered suspect financial relationships. 188
ACOs will need to defy the idea that health care utilization and costs increase inappropriately
when physicians are able to reap financial profits from their referrals of health care services. It
may be optimal for physicians to refer within the ACO to meet the ACO's benchmarks and reap
financial profits. 189 Conventional wisdom about referrals and financial incentives will not
necessarily apply to A COs. People have argued that if physicians cannot benefit fmancially from
their referrals, they will make fewer referrals that are medically unnecessary and motivated
solely by profit under typical health care structures. 190 While participating in an ACO, a
physician's incentive is still motivated by profit because the physician is working towards a
piece of the savings from the gainsharing financial structure. With an ACO, physician selfreferrals do not necessarily imply selfish, personal profit motives, but an incentive to obtain more
money for the ACO to put back into improving health care. The profit motive with A COs is to
make less unnecessary self-referrals instead of more, however, without an exception, these
referrals could still violate the Codey Law.
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In order for an ACO to meet its goals, there may be an incentive for self-referrals. When
the ACO is evaluated, State officials will not only look to the providers who are part of the ACO,
but those outside as well that are treating the ACO patient. 191 A key part of the ACO concept is
that even if a patient is participating in an ACO, that patient is able to get care anywhere outside
of the AC0. 192 Ultimately, the ACO is held accountable for costs and services outside of the
ACO. Doctor and hospital groups also want to avoid being held financially accountable for
patients who go outside an ACO for care. 193 Although the savings an ACO would receive for
reaching certain benchmarks is above and beyond the traditional fee-for-service payments
providers will continue to receive, ACOs that do not meet their goals will receive penalties. 194
This concern will naturally lead to self-referrals within the ACO. The ACO will be incentivized
to make sure the care that its patient receives will not inhibit the strategy of the AC0. 195 If the
patient goes outside the ACO for treatment, the ACO may be taking a risk. If the ACO refers to
someone within the ACO - someone who is aware of and has agreed to the ACO' s goals- the
ACO might be taking on less risk. Presumably, the ACO primary care doctor, "the gatekeeper,"
will refer within the ACO to coordinate care. 196
However, to truly determine whether a physician self-referral law prohibits a particular
arrangement, three questions must be answered. 197 First, does the arrangement involve a referral
of a Medicaid patient by a physician? 198 Second, it must be determined if there is any significant
beneficial interest between the referring physician or family member of a physician and the
191
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entity to which the referral is being made. 199 If the answers to these questions are "yes," then it
must be determined whether it fits into an exception. 200
There will be numerous referrals within ACOs, especially because there is an incentive to
keep a patient within the ACO. However, the Codey Law states that "[a] practitioner shall not
refer a patient or direct an employee of the practitioner to refer a patient to a health care service
in which the practitioner, or the practitioner's immediate family, or the practitioner in
combination with the practitioner's immediate family who had the significant beneficial interest
prior to the effective date of' the law. 201 The Stark law broadly defines "referral" to "include a
request by a physician for an item or service payable under Medicare or Medicaid (including the
request by a physician for consultation with another physician and any test or procedure ordered
or performed by such other physician), or a request by a physician for the establishment of a plan
of care that includes the provision of a DHS."202 The ACO participants are responsible for
meeting certain quality and cost goals and therefore, participants will have a natural incentive to
refer to other members of the ACO who share the same goals. 203
The Codey Law prohibits referrals certain referrals when there is "a significant beneficial
interest."204 To determine if there is a significant beneficial interest, one can examine the
ownership and financial interests between the referring physicians. A financial relationship is
defmed as a direct or indirect ownership or investment interest in an entity through equity, debt,
or other means, or a direct or indirect compensation arrangement involving any remuneration,
directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in kind, between a physician (or immediate
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200
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family member) and an entity.2°5 Because ACO participants are all part of the same ACO legal
entity and will benefit financially from the success of the ACO, ACO participants could share a
significant beneficial interest.
A straightforward example of a direct ownership and financial would be if a referring
physician refers a Medicaid patient to a physical therapy business in which the referring
physician has equity interest, either through direct ownership or shares of stock. 206 As a result of
the ACO, an ACO participant does not necessarily have direct ownership interest or shares of
stock in the physician's business to which he is referring to nor does the referring position have a
direct ownership interest or shares of stock in the ACO. New Jersey A COs will be a non-profit
legal entity. Therefore, referring ACO participants will not violate the Codey law because of
direct ownership and financial interests.
However, an indirect ownership or financial interest can also violate the Codey law. For
example, if a physician refers a Medicaid patient to a psychiatrist and the referring physician is a
direct co-owner of an imaging licensing company, which provided a capital loan to the
psychiatrisfs practice, there would be a violation.2°7 This indirect ownership situation could
happen, but not as a result of the ACO because the referring physician would not have a coownership interest of the imaging licensing business as a result ofboth being ACO participants.
Also, as stated above, the referring physician could never be a direct co-owner of the ACO.
Direct compensation agreements can also lead to violations. For example, if the referring
physician has an independent contractual relationship with a clinical lab and also makes referrals
to it, there's a potential violation.208 A physician participating in the ACO would require some
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sort of contract that sets out the A COs compensation guidelines if awarded money through
gainsharing, which could be considered a direct compensation agreement. However, this
contractual agreement is with the ACO and not the physician or entity to which the physician is
referring to. The referring physician is technically not making referrals directly to the ACO but
instead is making referrals to someone who also has a contractual relationship with the ACO.
This sort of direct compensation agreement example applied to A COs will probably not cause a
violation.
However, an indirect compensation arrangement could pose a problem. A COs do offer
compensation arrangements to referring physicians. For example, two physicians are ACO
participants and refer to each other. They are not co-owners of any business nor do they have any
direct financial relationship as a result of the ACO. However, they both have a significant
beneficial interest in the ACO itself because they can receive money through gainsharing. By
referring to another physician who is an ACO participant instead of one who is not could
significantly benefit the physician if it ultimately improves the quality measures of the ACO.
Therefore, even if the traditional financial or ownership relationship does not exist, simply being
a part of the ACO leaves no room to avoid violating the Codey Law if referring to another ACO
participant.
The Codey Law also has exceptions, but they will not prevent self-referral violation.
Specifically, the law says that "[t]he restrictions on referral of patients established in this section
shall not apply to ... medical treatment or a procedure that is provided at the practitioner's
medical office and for which a bill is issued directly in the name of the practitioner or the
practitioner's medical office; ... renal dialysis; ... and ambulatory surgery or procedures
requiring anesthesia performed at a surgical practice registered with the Department of Health

and Senior Services pursuant to subsection g. of section 12 ofP.L.1971, c. 136 (C.26:2H-12) or
at an ambulatory care facility licensed by the Department of Health and Senior Services to
perform surgical and related services," if certain conditions are met. In an ACO, these exceptions
will not apply for the same reasons described above. Even if the referring physicians fall under
one of these exceptions, as ACO participants, they will still violate the Codey law.

B. The Board of Medical Examiners can issue an advisory letter, which will excuse the
Demonstration Project from provisions of the Codey Law.
Because the financial incentives that may influence self-referrals can actually provide an
incentive for better care at lower costs in an ACO, participants should not be penalized for
carrying out the goals of the ACO and the best interest of the patient, despite a potential conflict
with the Codey Law. To ensure health care providers will be exempt from penalties for violating
the Codey Law, New Jersey State Board of Medical Examiners (BME) should develop Codey
Law waivers via an advisory letter for ACOs established in New Jersey. These waivers will
prevent the A COs from violating the law and ease the concerns of other physicians who might be
hesitant to make referrals, even if they are not violating the law.
The BME's responsibility includes the protection of the public's health, safety, and
welfare, which includes "licensing medical professionals, adopting regulations, determining
standards of practice, investigating allegations of physician misconduct, and disciplining those
who do not adhere to requirements - thereby assuring the public that the physicians are qualified,
competent, and honest. " 209 The State has given the Board of Medical Examiners the authority to
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draft advisory letters, which have the power to provide regulatory waivers for health care
providers.210 The State BME has issued regulations in the past regarding the self-referrallaw?

11

C. New Jersey can look to recent federal regulations providing exceptions to the federal
self-referral law for guidance.
Because CMS and HHS's Office of the Inspector General ("OIG") have recognized the
need for the Stark Waiver, New Jersey should follow the federal government's lead in waiving
parts of the Codey Law for ACOs. First, the BME letter should include a pre-participation
waiver, which will allow proper start-ups? 12 Moreover, the waivers should be selfimplementing. This will be especially important in New Jersey where it is somewhat unclear
which relationships will violate the Codey Law. If the waivers are self-implementing, the health
care providers will not need to worry about clarifying the relationship among themselves or
soliciting advisory letters regarding their specific relationship before making the referral. This
will foster an efficient system of making the best health care choices for patients.
However, for those relationships that do violate the Codey Law, it will also be important
for New Jersey to require that the terms of the relationship be reasonably related to one
enumerated principal of the AC0. 213 It is advisable, however, that the BME put in guidance as to
what a reasonable relationship entails. Finally, in order to assess how reasonable the relationship
is and in the spirit of the transparency of the Codey law, documentation should also be required
if the BME so requests it. As ACOs are becoming more popular throughout the country, health
care providers may experience greater scrutiny as to what the financial arrangements are within
the ACO. Keeping accurate records will only protect the ACO in the future.
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IV. Conclusion
New Jersey's legislation enacting the Medicaid Accountable Care Organization
Demonstration Project may violate New Jersey's Codey Law because it encourages physician
self-referrals that are prohibited by the Codey Law. However, a closer look at the different
financial relationships within the ACO show that not all referrals will violate the Codey Law. By
analyzing the federal governmenfs waivers to the Stark Law, New Jersey can establish
regulations that will allow ACOs to optimize gainsharing without violating the law.
Nevertheless, ACOs are a transitional program and not a model that will last forever. 214 Because
improvement and calculated savings are based on the ACOs previous performance, there will
come a point where the ACO cannot meet the A COs criteria without sacrificing patient care.215
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